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Abstract: 
This paper considers the well studied problem of the existence of an undominated point, under the assumption of 
lexicographic preferences of voters, as espoused by Taylor in [24]. We extend Taylor's model to situations were we 
allow for (i) voters to have different ranings of the issues in n- dimensional issue space and (ii) a candidate to be 
disregarded by a voter if his stand on any one or more of the issues involved in the election is perceived to be too 
extreme by the voter and (iii) combinations of (i) and (ii). We extend the results of Taylor by demonstrating the 
non-existence of an equilibrium point in these models in general and then showing that under special cir- 
cumstances, specialized variants of the “median” point(s) represent equilib- rium or undominated points in these 
models too. Thus a model of voting behavior results that is closer approximation of reality in that historically 
incumbents tend to win. The primary conclusion of the paper is to suggest that incumbents tend to have an 
advantage when the election process is characterized by a large presence of special interests or as information be- 
comes more expensive to acquire. 
 
Article: 
1 Introduction 
Plurality-rule elections are one of the most widely studied problems in voting theory. In this problem, a set of 
voters elects one of two candidates to office. The candidate which receives the most votes wins the election. Each 
candidate must therefore determine how to position herself with respect to voters in order to win. 
 
In our model, we assume that there is a two candidate election in a simple plurality-rule system. We further assume 
that the entire set of voters is concerned with the same issues in the issue space, and that the voters have single-
peaked preferences in this space. Finally, we assume the election satisfies the following five conditions [18]: 
 
1. All voters know the candidates' positions on the issues.  
2. The candidates' strategic opportunities are identical.  
3. Candidates maximize plurality. 
4. Candidates know the form of voters' preferences on the issues.  
 
A candidate that cannot be defeated by another candidate in a pairwise election is said to be undominated. If an 
undominated candidate exists, then a majority-rule equilibrium exists. However, it is not necessarily true that an 
undominated candidate exists. For this reason, an important problem in voting theory is to define simple conditions 
for the existence of an undominated point [18]. 
 
Many researchers have addressed the problem of determining the conditions for an undominated point under 
different kinds of voter preferences: Euclidean metric i.e., circular preferences ([1, 4, 5, 9, 10, 14, 19]), city block 
(L1) norms ([21, 27]) or polyhedral norms ([6]). However, as shown in many studies (see for example, [16], [19], 
[20]), the probability of existence of such an undominated point is almost always zero, when the number of issues 
in the election are high enough. In that case, voting cycles are possible and the election may be manipulated [1, 
18]. Observing election outcomes however, contradicts this finding in that incumbents usually defeat challengers 
[26]. This paradox suggests that voting model assumptions do not fully capture actual voting behavior, and the 
purpose of this paper is to elicit a voting model that attempts to remedy this. However, it must be pointed out that 
several researchers have attempted to do the same before. For example, it is shown in [25] that if the model of 
voter behavior is altered only slightly to incorporate any of the following several plausible characteristics of 
decision making such as, cost of change, cost of uncertainty, bounded rationality etc., the probability of stability 
coverges to 1 as the population size increases. 
 
Our principal point of departure in this paper is an alternative method of measuring disutility or voter preferences, 
introduced in the seminal work of Taylor in [24]. This work proposed using lexicographic preferences to rank the 
candidates in an election. Such voting behavior presupposes that the voters rank the election issues in a 
hierarchical manner, in the order of their relative importance. For example, a conservative voter may rank deficit 
control above social welfare expenditure, whereas a liberal may do the reverse. Similarly, an unemployed voter 
may perceive job creation as the most important issue and place it ahead of both deficit control and social welfare 
expenditure; or yet another voter may perceive abortion as the leading issue in an election. Notwithstanding the 
ranking employed by an individual voter, any issue is assumed to dominate the ones that are deemed less important 
and is in turn, dominated by the ones that are considered more important. Finally, a voter evaluates all the 
candidates by comparing their stands on the different issues separately and in a fixed sequence; the particular 
sequence employed by a voter is supposed to mirror his views about the relative significance of the tissues. 
 
The use of lexicographic preferences for measuring disutility in definitely not new and can be traced back almost 
forty years, when social scientists proposed it to allow a decision maker to choose between alternatives of non- 
comparable subjective value; a good survey is available in [29]. As far back as 1954, Hausner showed in [13], that 
if a set of preferences satisfies all axioms for von Neumann and Morgenstern utility, except for the Archimedan 
axiom, then those preferences can be represented, not by a scalar, but by vec- tors. Further, if these vectors are of 
finite size, the decision process of choosing the alternative with the least disutility is akin to the lexicographic 
principle elicited above. The use of lexicographic preferences was further advocated by Georgescu-Roegen [12] in 
his Principle of Irreducibility of Human Wants, which hypothesized that “human needs and wants are 
hierarchized”, and also by Chipman in [ 13], who stated that (quote from [24]) 
 
“Utility, in its most general form, is a lexicographic ordering, represented by a finite of infinite dimensional 
vector with real components ... and these vectors ... are ordered lexicographically”. 
 
In addition to the above, we also argue that the imposition of lexicographic preferences is further justified if one 
considers rational ignorance or interest group participation in the political process — facts that are particularly true 
in the context of most present day elections. Voters must expend resources on information to determine where a 
candidate stands on each issue. A voter may thus find it irrational to acquire information about issues for which 
they do not feel strongly. Furthermore, interest groups tend to promote single tissues. If one assumes that the goal 
of any group is to transfer the maximum amount of public wealth to their cause, then group members would 
always vote for the candidate who had positioned herself closest to their ideal point with respect to that issue. 
 
It is worthwhile to note that similar hierarchical comparisons are well known in other areas such as Decision 
Theory. For example, in Goal Programming we assume that a decision maker who is faced with optimizing a 
model with respect to various criteria, i.e., objective functions, first optimizes with respect to the most important 
one. If multiple optimal solutions exist, then the second most important criteria is optimized within this set of all 
optimal solutions obtained in the first stage. This process is continued until either all criteria have been optimized 
hierarchically, or, a unique optimal solution is reached at some intermediate stage and is chosen as the best 
solution. Another related approach is the well known Analytical Hierarchy Process. 
 
The principal result of Taylor in [24] was to show that if all voters had the same ranking of issues in an election, 
and voted in accordance with the lexicographic process described above, then an undominated point always exists 
and is given by the set of all medians; a theoretical result that is in agreement with realistic elections. If different 
voters have different rankings however, he showed that an undominated point may not exist and gave necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the existence of such a point in the two dimensional issue space. In this paper, we 
have extended this concept of lexicographic measurement of disutility to more refined models where we allow for 
(i) voters to have different rankings of the issues in the general n-dimensional issue space and (ii) a candidate to be 
disregarded by a voter if her stand on any one or more of the issues involved in the election is perceived to be too 
extreme by the voter and (iii) combinations of (i) and (ii). We show that specialized variants of the concept of 
medians also constitute equilibrium or undominated points in these models. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. In the next section we discuss preliminaries and Sect. 3 considers 
our model under the assumption that different voters use different rankings of the issues in their comparison of 
candidates. Section 4 then examines the results of the preceding section in light of another assumption, namely, 
that voters may abstain from voting. Finally the fifth section summarizes the conclusions of our study. The time 
complexity of all the tests and computations are also discussed at appropriate places in the paper. 
 
2 Preliminaries 
We assume that there are n issues involved in the election and that the leftmost and rightmost stands that any voter 
or candidate can take on any issue are denoted by 0 and 1 respectively; hence, for the purpose of the paper, the 
term issue space will refer to the unit hypercube in ℜn. There are P voters, each of whom is assumed to have a 
unimodal preference function and can therefore be represented by his unique ideal point in the issue space. The 
voters themselves will be referred to as v
1
, v
2
,... v
P
 respectively, with the ideal point of voter v
i
 being given by the 
vector (  
 ,   
 ,…  
 ,…,  
 ) where   
  denotes the location of the ideal point of voter v
i
 on issue j. Figure 1 illustrates 
an example of the configuration of five voters, namely v
1
 through v
1
 who are located in a two dimensional issue 
space. Unless otherwise mentioned, we will assume throughout that the voters have equal preferences for all the 
issues. Where there is no ambiguity, we will refer to a candidate or a voter located at a point x = (x1, x2, . . xn) in the 
issue space as the candidate/voter x, with xi denoting the position of candidate/voter x on issue i. For any two 
distinct points x and y in the issue space, the closed interval [x,y] will be used to denote the entire line segment 
connecting them, and (x,y] the open ended interval obtained therefrom, by excluding the endpoint x. 
 
We only consider cases where there are two candidates vying for the votes of the P voters, one of whom is an 
incumbent and the other the challenger. If a voter finds that both candidates are equally “far” from his ideal point, 
he is assumed to vote for the incumbent. There are several reasons for advocating this incumbency advantage. 
First, since an incumbent has a voting history, voters feel more comfortable voting for a known commodity (as the 
old saying goes, “better the devil you know ....”). A second reason for this assumption is the uncertainty/risk faced 
by voters in voting for a candidate. Voters are always faced with the risk that once in office, a candidate may not 
vote according to her campaign rhetoric (e.g. Read my lips, no new taxes). Therefore, if two candidates have the 
same mean on a particular issue, it is reasonable to assume that a voter will perceive the incumbent as the 
candidate with the lowest probability of deviation from their stated position, and therefore, vote for her. Finally, 
incumbency advantage can also result from the fact that there is always a “cost” associated with any change in 
office (see [25] for a good discussion on this issue) and voters will refuse to incur this cost unless the challenger is 
perceived to have a  substantially'' better stand than the incumbent. 
 
In our initial model, we will also assume that every voter is required to vote, relaxing this assumption only later in 
the paper. With a majority rule for declaring the winner of the election, this would imply that the challenger would 
have to get at least (⌊LP/2⌋ + 1) votes to win the election; in other words, the incumbent can win the election if at 
least ⌈FP/2⌉ voters vote for her. An undominated point, is defined as a point such that if an incumbent were to 
locate there, no challenger could win an election from her. 
 
In this paper, we often project the voters on their respective stands on any one issue, say j. When projected along 
issue j,   
   
 will be assumed to represent the location of the leftmost voter on this issue,   
   
 the location of the 
second voter from left and so forth, with   
   
 denoting the location of the voter with the rightmost stand on this 
issue. The location of the “centrist” voter, i.e., the median voter, is therefore anywhere inside the set of all medians 
along this issue, that we denote by Mj. It is easy to see that Mj is the point   
 ⌈   ⌉ 
 if P odd, or the entire interval 
[  
 ⌈   ⌉ 
,   
 ⌈     ⌉ 
] in case P is even. For example, in figure 1, considering the voters only on their stands on issue 
2 we see that   
   
 =   
 ,   
   
 =   
 ,   
   
 =   
 ,   
   
 =   
  and   
   
 =   
 . Thus M2 =   
   
 =   
 . Given a voter v
i
 and a 
point x in the issue space, if   
  ≤ xj (respectively,   
  < xj) we will say that v
i
 is to the left (respectively, strictly to 
the left) of x on issue j. The notion of a voter being to the right, or strictly to the right of a given point is similar. 
Thus by our definition, in Fig. 1, v
4
 is to the left (or right) of y on issue 1 (since   
  = y
1
), and strictly to the left of y 
on issue 2. 
 
 
 
We now define a set of special locations in the issue space, called the set of all Total Medians of the voting 
population. This set, that we denote by M is the location of all the “centrist” candidates who occupy the middle of 
the road position on every issue, and is characterized as follows. If P is odd then, M is given by the unique point x 
in the issue space that satisfies: 
 
{x|xj =   
 ⌈   ⌉ 
 for j = 1,2,…, n}            (1) 
 
On the other hand, when P is even, M is the set of all points x in the issue space that satisfy 
 
{x|  
 ⌈   ⌉ 
 ≤ xj ≤   
 ⌈   ⌉ 
 for j = 1, 2,…, n} (2) 
 
It is easy to see that the projection of the set M on any issue j is simply the set Mj (see Fig. 1 where the points 
representing M1, M2 and the Total Median M, of the five voters in the figure are shown).
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As mentioned in the introduction, our model assumes that voters vote in accordance with the lexicographic choice 
rule, as elicited by Taylor in [24]. For any voter v
i
 in a homogenous population, this process can be summarized as 
the following algorithm. 
 
Algorithm Lexico-Comparison (Homogenous Population). 
 
1. Choose the most important issue at the Present Issue. 
2. Compare both candidates according to their stand on the Present Issue.   
3. Vote for the candidate whose position on the Present Issue has the least  disutility and stop. If both 
candidates are found to be equal and all issues have been considered, vote for the incumbent and stop. 
Else go to Step 4. 
4. Choose the next most important issue as the Present Issue and go back to Step 2. 
 
By this method of measuring disutility, it can be verified that if x and y are the two candidates in Fig. 1, then voter 
v
4
 would vote for y but voter v
5
 would vote for x instead. Based on this voting behavior, Taylor stated that: 
 
Lemma 1 (from Taylor [24]): Given a homogeneous population of voters that votes in accordance with Algorithm 
Lexico-Comparison, a point is undominated iff it is a Total Median of the voting population.
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Since a Total Median of a voting population is always guaranteed to exist, Taylor's result therefore guarantees that 
in a homogenous population of voters, an undominated point will always exist. Further, it also allows a simple 
characterization of the core of the voter distribution, which is defined as the set of all undominated points. By this 
lemma, it can be asserted the core is given by the set of all Total Medians, i.e. M, and hence characterized by (1) 
and (2). 
 
3 Heterogeneous voting populations 
As mentioned before, the primary result in [24] is about a population of homogeneous voters, i.e., every voter 
agrees that issue 1 is most important, followed by issue 2, issue 3 etc., in that order. However, in more realistic 
situations, this assumption may not be true. It is only reasonable to expect that in most real world elections, the 
different voters involved have different priorities and hence, different perceptions about the relative importance of 
the issues involved. For this purpose, Taylor also studied the case where different voters have different rankings of 
the issues involved in the election. We refer to such a population as being heterogeneous and its study is the focus 
of this section. 
 
When the voting population is heterogeneous, different voters may have different perceptions about the relative 
importance of the n different issues. Hence different voters may compare the two candidates by evaluating their 
respective stands on the n issues in different sequences. Thus the entire voting population would compare the 
candidates involved in accordance with Algorithm Lexico-Comparison, with the modification that voters may 
differ in the ranking of the issues used in the algorithm, and may hence compare the candidates' stands on the 
issues in different orders. For example, in Fig. 1 , if we assume that voters v
1
, v
2
 and v
3
 rank issue 1 as more 
important than issue 2 but voters v
4
 and v
5
 do the reverse, then it can be verified that the voting pattern is as 
follows: v
1
, v
2
 and v
3
 vote for the candidate at y; v
4
 votes for x and v
5
 votes for y. This is in contrast to the 
homogenous case where v
4
 voted for y and v
5
 for x. 
 
In [24], Taylor considered the special case of a heterogeneous voting population when there are only two issues 
involved, i.e., the issue space is two dimensional. He showed that an undominated point may not exist and gave 
necessary and sufficient conditions for its existence. We will now study the general case where the number of 
issues, i.e., dimensions, is arbitrary. 
 
For that purpose, the following definitions are needed first. An issue will be referred to as a dominant issue if there 
is at least one voter who ranks it as the most important issue; without loss of generality, we will assume for the rest 
of this section that the dominant issues in the election are issues 1 through k where k < n. Then the set of all voters 
that rank issue j, where 1 < j < k, as the most important issue, will be referred to as Gj, and the number of voters in 
this set will be denoted by |Gj| — it is worthwhile to note that in the two dimensional case, this reduces to what 
Taylor refers to as salience groups in [18]. It is easy to see that for any two different issues, say 1 and 2, the two 
groups G1 and G2 do not have any voter in common; in other words, the set {G1 ∩ G2} is empty. Given a 
dominant issue j, we often project the voters in Gj along this issue. When this is done, the set of all medians of the 
voters in Gj when they are projected along the issue that they consider most important, namely, issue j, will be 
denoted by M(Gj). 
 
We will now show that for a heterogeneous population of voters, the non- existence of an undominated point, as 
demonstrated in [24], is entirely due to the fact that in our original model, the candidates are allowed to assume 
similar stands on the dominant issues in the election. This can be demonstrated by focusing on a voting game 
where the admissible strategy set disallows such coincident locations in the issue space; in other words, a situation 
where the challenger is prohibited from assuming the same stand as the incumbent on any dominant issue. 
Restrictive though it may be, this can occur in elections where the process of entry by the candidates into the issue 
space, i.e., announcing their respective stands on different issues, or at least the dominant ones, is sequential rather 
than simultaneous. In other words, these are situations where the incumbent gets the opportunity to announce her 
election platform before the challenger gets to do so
3
. An example in point is the case of parliamentary elections in 
Commonwealth countries such as Canada, where the ruling party gets to choose and announce the election date, 
without having to consult the opposition parties. Unlike the United States, successive parliamentary elections in 
Canada do not have to be at equal and therefore, predetermined intervals (see [28], pg. 139, 251); these intervals 
are allowed to differ by several months, giving the ruling party considerable leverage in deciding when to hold an 
election and when to announce it to the public. In turn, this provides the governing party an advantage over the 
opposition, by (i) allowing it to arrange for an adequate amount of lead time to formulate its own election platform 
and (ii) being the first to announce this to the voters, well in advance of the opposition. With such a sequential 
process, where the challenger is relegated to being the follower in terms of informing the voters, our assumption 
about the challenger never assuming an identical stand as the incumbent on any issue, is then a simple logical 
consequence of our previous assumption of incumbency advantage. In other words, given our earlier assumption of 
incumbency advantage (a voter votes for the incumbent if he finds both the challenger and incumbent similar), it 
would be unreasonable for the challenger to assume the same position as the incumbent on any issue, particularly 
the dominant ones. 
 
In addition to the above, another observation about most real life elections also lends further credence to our 
assumption of disallowing coincident locations between the incumbent and the challenger on dominant issues. 
Given the polarization amongst political parties in most real elections (conservative vs. liberal or right-leaning vs. 
left-leaning or Republican vs. Democrat) it is rarely the case that candidates from the two main parties have 
absolutely identical views on any important subject, even in the case where their views are similar. A good 
example of this would be in the context of USA and Canada, where a major issue in most recent elections has been 
deficit and debt reduction. On this issue however, although all major parties have favored deficit cutting, they have 
consistently disagreed, often substantially, on the extent and nature of the cuts. 
 
Notwithstanding the justification for this rule elicited above, we now define the Dominant Median of a 
heterogeneous voting population, denoted by M
D
. Given the dominant issues 1 through k, the j
th
 coordinate of the 
Dominant Median of the voting population is given by: 
 
  
   
                                                  
                                             
                 
 
 
Thus  
 , the j
th
 coordinate of the Dominant Median, is determined as follows: if issue j is a dominant issue then 
  
  is any point that is a median of all voters in Gj, when they are projected along issue j. If issue j is non-
dominant, then the exact value of   
  is irrelevant; any point in the set [0, 1] can serve as the j
th
 coordinate of the 
Dominant Median
4
. As an illustration, consider the situation shown in Fig. 2 with G1 = {v
1
, v
2
} and G2 = {v
3
}. In 
this case, one Dominant Median exists as shown in the figure. If however, all voters ranked issue 1 as more 
important than issue 2, then a Dominant Median in the figure would be given by the point   
  on the abscissa (in 
fact, any point on the vertical line at   
  whose height is at most 1, would suffice).  On the other hand, if all voters 
ranked issue 2 ahead of issue 1, the point   
  on the ordinate would be a Dominant Median in that figure.  
 
 
 
It is important to note that only the dominant issues are critical in deciding the location of the Dominant Median of 
a heterogeneous population. Further, similar to a Total Median of a homogeneous voting population, a Dominant 
Median of a heterogeneous voting population is also guaranteed to exist. With these definitions it can be stated 
that: 
 
Lemma 2. Given a heterogeneous voting population that votes in accordance with Algorithm Lexico-Comparison, 
if the incumbent and challenger always assume different stands on the dominant issues, then any Dominant 
Median will be an undominated point. 
 
Proof. Since M
D
 is purported to be the undominated point, the incumbent is located there and the challenger is 
located at some point in the issue space, say y, with the property that yi ≠  
  for every issue j from 1 to k. 
Consider the group G1. All voters in this group consider issue 1 as the most important issue, and it is known that y1 
≠  
 by our choice of   
  as per (3). This ensures that exactly ⌈|G1|/2⌉ voters in this group will find themselves 
closer to the incumbent than the challenger on issue 1 and hence, will vote for him. Therefore, the incumbent is 
assured of at least ⌈|G1|/2⌉votes from the group G1. By using the same argument, it is possible to see that the 
incumbent is guaranteed at least ⌈|Gj|/2⌉ votes from each of the groups G1 through Gk. Taken together with the fact 
that there is no voter common to any two or more of these groups and that              , it can be seen that this 
implies that the incumbent is assured a minimum of 
 
  
    
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
votes, thereby ensuring that the challenger cannot defeat him in an election. ∎ 
 
Lemma 2 suggests that given its assumptions, an undominated point always exists, and its location is determined 
solely by the dominant issues of the election. If the assumptions of the lemma hold, then the incumbent should 
identify the dominant issues of the election and choose a position that is dictated by the location of the voters in 
each of the different groups in this heterogeneous voting population. Alternatively stated, given that the incumbent 
has an established reputation, it will be impossible for a challenger to locate in the same position as the challenger. 
Voters will always select the incumbent since there is less risk that he will deviate from his stated position in such 
a scenario. 
 
4 Admissible sets and abstentions 
One of the shortcomings of the lexicographic choice rule espoused in the previous discussion is that when 
comparing the candidates sequentially on each issue, the first time that a voter finds a candidate closer to his ideal 
point on an issue, he immediately votes for the candidate regardless of how extreme he finds the candidate's 
position. It may be that the voter desires both candidates to be within an acceptable range on all relevant issues. 
We use two examples to illustrate this concept. Voters may rank defense issues above other issues only if defense 
expenditures fall within some given range. Defense expenditures below some minimum level may be too low to 
affect any kind of change in a country's preparedness to protect itself from invasion. Increasing expenditures above 
some maximum level may be viewed as wasteful in that once a certain defense threshold has been reached, all 
further expenditures would be superfluous. If abortion is plotted in the issue space from the position of absolutely 
legal to absolutely illegal, we may again find voter averse to extreme positions. Most voters would probably fall 
somewhere between the positions of allowing abortion in the case of rape or incest to disallowing abortion in the 
third trimester. Hence, in an attempt to address this shortcoming, we now introduce the concept of the Admissible 
Set of a voter. To keep the analysis tractable, we begin by assuming that the voting population is homogenous, 
relaxing it only towards the end of the section. 
 
Consider a voter v
i
 and his ideal location along issue j, which is given by   
 . We will now assume that in addition, 
every voter v
i
 also requires that in order for a candidate to be even acceptable to him to vote for, the candidate's 
stand on issue j must be between two limits       
  and       
 , where 0 ≤       
  ≤   
  ≤       
  ≤ 1. Considering 
all the issues involved in the election, v
i
 would thus require that any candidate that is outside his Admissible Set A
i
, 
where 
 
            
           
                                 
 
will not even be eligible for his vote. In general, the Admissible Set of each voter v
i
 would be defined by 2n 
inequalities. Thus in two dimensions, the set A
i
 would define a rectangle around the location of v
i
 (see Fig. 3), in 
three dimensions, a cube and so forth. Further, if both the challenger and the incumbent assume a position that is 
outside A
i
, then v
i
 will not vote in the election at all. This concept of abstention is similar to that of reservation 
price in economics, where a consumer wishing to purchase a nonessential good will not do so if the price of the 
good exceeds a certain limit (called the reservation price). If the act of voting imposes costs on voters in terms of 
time, etc. we could further argue that the marginal cost of voting exceeds the marginal benefits when all candidates 
position themselves outside of the admissible set. It is also interesting to note that such ideas of imposing limits on 
the possible stands that the candidates can assume is not entirely new — see [15] for a similar voting model where 
the set of all feasible positions in a two dimensional issue space is restricted by a line. Finally, note that the result 
of Lemma 1 can now be considered a special case of the results of the present section, one where every voter's 
Admissible Set in the entire issue space itself. Taken together, this implies that the voting behaviour of a voter v
i
 
can now be described by the following modified version of the previous such algorithm. 
 
Algorithm Admissible Lexico-Comparison 
 
1. Define the Admissible Set Ai. Discard from consideration any candidate that is outside Ai. Thus a 
candidate is eligible only if she is within A
i
. Examine the eligible candidates. 
a) If no eligible candidates exists, stop and abstain from voting. 
b) If only one eligible candidate is found, vote for her and stop. 
c) If both candidates are found eligible, go to Step 2. 
2. Choose the most important issue as the Present Issue. 
3. Compare both candidates according to their stand on the Present Issue. Vote for that candidate whose 
position on the Present Issue has the least disutility. If both candidates are found to be equal on the 
Present Issue and all issues have been considered, vote for the incumbent and stop. If not, go to Step 4. 
4. Choose the next most important issue as the Present Issue and go back to Step 2. ∎ 
 
Thus with this voting behavior, if x and y in Fig. 3 represent the two candidates standing for election, then voter v
1
 
will vote for the candidate at x, voter v
3
 for y and v
2
 will abstain from voting for any one of these two candidates. 
Since we now allow for an Admissible Set around each voter's ideal point, it is possible to have situations where 
the distribution of the voter's ideal points and their Admissible Sets are such that there is no location in the issue 
space that is within the Admissible Set of all the voters. Consider the following example shown in Fig. 4, where 
five voters v
1
 through v
5
 are assumed to be in the simplest space possible, namely, a one dimensional issue space. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Assume, as shown in the figure, that the voters are located at   
  = δ;   
  = 2δ;   
  = 4δ;   
  = 7δ and   
  = 8δ, where 
δ is a positive number less than 1/9. Let x, y and z be three additional points at 3δ, 5δ and 6δ respectively. In 
addition, define the Admissible Sets of the voters as follows       
  =       
  = 0;       
  =       
  =   
 ;       
  
=   
 ;       
  = z;       
  =       
  = y and       
  =       
  = 1. Now suppose that: (i) the incumbent is located 
on the median, which is given by   
  in this case. Then the challenger can locate on   
  and can win two votes, 
namely those of v
1
 and v
2
. 1 The incumbent would only get the vote of v
3
 and thus lose the election. Consider next 
case (ii), where the incumbent is located strictly to the right of the median. Then the challenger can locate on the 
median and get the three votes of v
1
, v
2
 and v
3
, thus defeating the incumbent. This leaves the following two cases: 
(iii) either the incumbent locates somewhere in the interval [x,   
 ) or (iv) or in the interval [0, x). In case (iii) the 
challenger can locate on   
  thereby getting the votes of v
1
 and v
2
 . The incumbent would not get any votes at all, 
and would thus lose the election. Which brings us to the final case (iv), where the incumbent is located in the 
interval [0,x). The challenger can now locate at y and win the three votes of v
3
, v
4
 and v
5
, thereby defeating the 
incumbent. This example thus allows us to conclude that in a homogeneous population of voters that votes in 
accordance with Algorithm Admissible Lexico-Comparison, there may not exist an undominated point. 
 
Having demonstrated the possibility of non-existence of an undominated point in the case of voters who abstain, 
we now restrict our attention to special cases where an undominated point is guaranteed to exist. To that end define 
the Core Admissibility Set, C, as the set of all locations in the issue space which are within the Admissible Set of 
all the voters, as shown in Fig. 3. In other words, 
 
 
     
 
   
                   
 
Note that the set C may not exist, as in the example shown in Fig. 4. But if it does, then it would consist of all 
points x in the issue space that satisfy 
 
      
           
                                      
 
Given this assumption, there is an easy way of characterizing C. Consider the voters on any given issue j; if there 
exists a pair of voters i and k such that       
  <       
 , then the set C can not exist. Conversely, if there does not 
exist any such pair of voters, and we define 
 
           
 
       
                 
 
       
                  
 
as the two endpoints of the interval set C on issue j, then it is guaranteed that Cj—min ≤ Cj—max. 
 
Proposition 3. Given that each voter has an Admissible Set around his ideal point in the issue space, the Core 
Admissibility Set C exists iff Cj—min ≤ Cj—max for each issue j, where Cj—min and Cj—max are defined by (7). 
Further, if C exists, then it is characterized by the inequalities: 
 
                                                         
 
If the Core Admissibility Set C exists, then any candidate that locates inside it would find herself to be universally 
acceptable to all the voters. For the rest of the discussion, we will only focus on the cases where the set C exists 
and examine two special cases where an undominated point does exist. The first of these, and the simplest, is when 
the set C exists and there is at least one Total Median contained in it. In that case, it is readily shown that Lemma 1 
still holds. This enables us to restate the lemma as: 
 
Lemma 4. Given a homogeneous population of voters that votes in accordance with Algorithm Admissible Lexico-
Comparison, if the Core Admissibility Set exists and at least one Total Median of the voter distribution is 
contained in it, then any Total Median that is inside C is an undominated point. 
 
Lemma 4 establishes one set of sufficient conditions for an undominated point to exist. Although the condition 
described in the lemma may seem overly restrictive, there is one interesting instance where it may hold. To 
illustrate this example, note that the condition that M be contained inside C implies that along every issue j, there 
exists a point xj in the interval [Cj-min, Cj-max] with the property that an equal number of the voters are to its left and 
right. One of the conditions under which this is true is shown in Fig. 5, where the entire voting population is 
polarized into three distinct groups: the “leftists” as given by v
1
 and v
2
 in the figure, that assume a left leaning 
position on every issue and are therefore to the left of Cj-min on every issue; an equal number of “rightists”, as given 
by v
4
 and v
5
, who are to the right of Cj-max on every issue and finally, some “centrists”, as given by v
3,
, that are 
inside C on every issue. It can be verified that whenever the voting population is polarized in this manner, with an 
equal number of “leftists” and “rightists”, it is guaranteed that there will exist a Total Median that is contained in 
C, thus satisfying the condition of Lemma 4. 
 
However, it is possible that no Total Median of the voter distribution is inside C. For example, in Fig. 3, the unique 
Total Median is outside the set C shown in the figure. Therefore we now turn to situations where such a condition 
may be true and discuss another special case where an undominated point always exists. In this version of our 
model we stipulate that one of the rules of the elections is that any candidate standing for the election must be 
universally acceptable, thus requiring all candidates to locate within the Core Admissibility Set C. Such a 
requirement could be implemented in practice by holding a two stage election where in the first stage, each voter 
nominates all the candidates that are acceptable to him, or conversely, the ones that are unacceptable to him. In the 
second stage the contest is between those candidates that have been found to be acceptable to all voters in the first 
stage. One example of such an election process could be in the selection of a candidate for an important senior 
management job, by the members of an interview board. Given this requirement of universal acceptability 
however, we now define a point within C that is referred to as the Constrained Total Median of the voting 
population. 
 
 
 
The Constrained Total Median, that we denote by M
C
, is obtained on the basis of the location of the median of the 
voters along each issue. To illustrate this, consider all the voters along issue j and the set of all medians along this 
issue, i.e. Mj. If the two intervals [Cj—min, Cj—max] and Mj intersect, then the j
th
 coordinate of M
C
, denoted by  
 , is 
given by any point, (and therefore, as we will assume, the midpoint) of this intersection. If not, it is given by either 
one of the two endpoints Cj—min or Cj—max, depending on which of them is closer to Mj. In other words, M
C
 is 
characterized as 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                             
                  
                                   
                                  
   
                  ≠   
                            
                            
      
 
The Constrained Total Median of the voting population in Fig. 3 is shown therein. Thus M
C
 is obtained by trying to 
“graviate” towards the nearest median along every issue, while being constrained to remain inside C; hence the 
name. The definition of M
C
 as per (9) also ensures that if the set C exists, then the Constrained Total Median is 
also guaranteed to exist. Given this definition, we can state that: 
 
Lemma 5. Given a homogeneous population of voters that votes in accordance with Algorithm Admissible Lexico-
Comparison, if the Core Admissibility Set exists and it is required that any candidate standing for the election be 
universally acceptable to all voters, i.e., locate within the Core Admissibility Set, then the Constrained Total 
Median of the voting population, as obtained in (9), is an undominated point. 
 
Proof. Suppose that the statement is not true and hence, there is a challenger located at a point x inside C that can 
take at least (⌊P/2⌋ + 1) votes from an incumbent at MC. Assume that x and MC are coincident on issues 1 though k 
and on issue (k + 1), xk+1 ≠    
 . However, since both candidates are required to be universally acceptable to all 
voters, it is guaranteed that xk+1 is contained in the interval [C(k+1)—min, C(k+1)—max]. Nevertheless, regardless of 
where xk+1 is inside the interval [c(k+1)—min, C(k+1)—max], by virtue of the fact that xk+1 ≠    
 , at least ⌈P/2⌉ voters 
will find M
C
 closer to themselves then x on issue (k + 1). Since M
C
 is universally acceptable to the entire voting 
population, these voters will therefore vote for the incumbent, thereby making it impossible for the challenger to 
get any more than ⌊P/2⌋ votes. ∎ 
 
Finally, note that the sufficient conditions outlined in Lemma 5 above are based on the crucial assumption that any 
candidate standing for the election be universally acceptable to all voters. If this does not happen, then the point 
M
C
 is no longer an undominated point. To see this, consider the situation shown in figure 3 and assume that the 
incumbent is located at the Constrained Total Median shown therein. Then an incumbent at the point z, who is not 
acceptable to voter v
2
, can take away the votes of v
1
 and v
3
, thereby defeating the incumbent.
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As a final consideration, we examine our basic model under the two assumptions of a heterogeneous voting 
population and that each voter has an Admissibility Set defined around his ideal point, which may not be the entire 
issue space itself. As before, the primary aim of the discussion will be to investigate conditions that guarantee the 
existence of an undominated point. Since this is the most complex version of our basic model, we restrict our 
discussion to one special case, namely, the heterogeneous counterpart of Lemma 4. 
 
To that end, we stipulate that the Core Admissibility Set of all voters, C, exist. Then, by combining the arguments 
used in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can show an analogous Lemma. 
 
Lemma 6. Given a heterogeneous voting population that votes in accordance with Algorithm Admissible Lexico-
Comparison, the following three conditions are sufficientfor the existence of an undominated point. 
 
(i) The Core Admissibility Set exists. 
(ii) For every dominant issue j, the intervals M(Gj) and [Cj-min, Cj-max] intersect and,  
(iii) Both candidates always assume different stands on each of the dominant issues, 
 
Further, when these three conditions hold, the location of an undominatedpoint is given by any point x whose 
coordinates satisfy: 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                               
                        
                                
                                  
  
         
 
         
                  
 
Note that Lemma 6 requires that M(Gj) and [Cj-min, Cj-max] intersect for each dominant issue j. This is less stringent 
than the corresponding requirement of Lemma 5, that the entire sets M and C intersect. This is due to the fact the 
former result also assumes that candidates are disallowed from taking similar stands on any of the dominant 
issues.
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5 Conclusions, limitations and future work 
In this paper, we have reconsidered the problem of the existence of an undominated point, under the assumption of 
lexicographic preferences of voters, that was introduced by Taylor in [18]. We argue that the assumption of 
lexicographic preferences may be fairly realistic in that: i) information of a candidate's position may be costly to 
obtain and process, and ii) special interest politics will always rank their interest above those of any other group. In 
our paper we have extended Taylor's model to situations where we allow for (i) voters to have different rankings of 
the issues in the general n-dimensional issue space and (ii) a candidate to be disregarded by a voter if his stand on 
any one or more of the issues involved in the election is perceived to be too extreme by the voter and (iii) 
combinations of (i) and (ii). We show that specialized variants of the concept of medians also constitute equilib- 
rium or undominated points in these models. Thus a model of voting behavior results that is closer approximation 
of reality in that historically incumbents tend to win. Our results therefore suggest that incumbents tend to have an 
advantage when the election process is characterized by a large presence of special interests or as information 
becomes more expensive to acquire. 
Any model that attempts to explain human behavior almost always has limitations, and of course, ours are no 
exception. Hence, we will devote the final part of the paper to discussing the limitations of the models considered 
in this paper and how future research can address some of them. 
 
In our opinion, one of the biggest limitations of lexicographic preferences is that it does not allow for trade-off 
between different issues. That many not always be realistic — for example, it is perfectly reasonable to assume 
that a voter may be willing to compromise on a moral issue, such as prayer in schools, for an economic issue, such 
as tax cuts. We believe that the best way to incorporate this phenomenon would be by researching hybrid models 
that synthesize some commonly used preferences, such as circular preferences with a lexicographic one; and this is 
our first suggested strand of future research on this topic. 
 
A second important shortcoming of our analysis is that we have not performed any  sensitivity analysis" of the 
results in this paper. For example, how would the existence results change, if one were to allow for a perturbation 
in the lexicographic preference of the voters - most importantly, this refers to a perturbation of the ranking of the 
issues by each voter. Do the existence results still hold? Our conjecture is that they may not. In that case, what 
other assumptions and/or restrictions are necessary for an undominated point to exist? 
 
Our final suggested avenue of future research is to focus solely on the case when an undominated point does not 
exist. Given that, it will be interesting to investigate and develop elegant characterizations of another solution 
concept, namely, the Simpson point, and efficient ways for computing it. 
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Notes: 
1. To calculate the time it would take to compute the set M, note that along each issue j, the set of all medians 
Mj can be obtained in O(P) time by using the algorithm in [2]. Since M is obtained by repeating this for all 
the issues, given the distribution of the voters in the issue space, M can be computed in O(nP) time. 
2. Interestingly, although Taylor was the first to enunciate the use of lexicographic preferences, similar ideas, 
based on the idea of restricting the decision making by the voter to one issue at a time, was also proposed 
elsewhere in the literature — a good discussion of this is available in [10] — see for example, Theorems 2 
and 3 in that paper. 
3. It is interesting to note that such sequential entry models are well studied in the context of competitive 
location models in geographical, rather than issue, space. In competitive location literature, they are 
referred to as Stackelberg [23] location models/games — see [T] for a recent survey of these models. 
4. Using similar arguments as before, it can be easily concluded that that MD can be computed in O(kP) time. 
5. A comment now on the time complexity of all the computations and checks involved. It can be seen that 
the two endpoints of C on each issue j, namely, Cj-min and Cj-max can be computed O(P) time by taking the 
minimum and maximum of the numbers       
  and       
  respectively. Checking whether Cj-min < Cj-max 
can then be performed in O(1) time. Since finding C entails repeating this for all issues, the existence of C 
can be verified in O(nP) time, and if C exists, it can be characterized as per (8) in the same time as well. As 
mentioned before, M, the set of all Total Medians, can be computed in O(nP) time. Given the two intervals 
Mj and [Cj-min, Cj-max], checking if they intersect can be done in O(1) time. This also implies that the j
th
 
coordinate of the Constrained Total Median, namely  
 , can be computed in O(1) time too, and hence, 
given M and C, M
C
 can be found in O(n) time. By repeating the check for the intersection of Mj and [Cj-min, 
Cj-max] for all the issues, it can also be verified that, given M and C, checking if these two sets intersect, can 
be done in O(n) time, and if they do intersect, a Total Median that is contained inside C can be produced in 
O(n) time as well. Taken together, these statements imply that all the computations and checks required by 
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, can be performed in the same time as it takes to compute M, i.e., O(nP) time. 
6. Finally, the issue of time complexity. As discussed previously, M(Gj) can be computed in O(P) time for 
any dominant issue j and the Core Admissibility Set can be computed in O(nP) time. Given C and M(Gj) 
for any dominant issue j, checking if the two intervals M(Gj) and [Cj-min, Cj-max] intersect can be 
accomplished in O(1) time. Since the computation of the undominated point in Lemma 6 entails calculating 
M(Gj) and performing this check for every dominant issue j, it can be concluded that given C, this 
computation can be accomplished in O(kP), and hence, O(nP) time. Therefore, as in Lemmas 4 and 5, all 
the computations and tests of Lemma 6 can also be performed in O(nP) time. 
 
